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(1930); Parrot v. Gulick, 145 Okla. 129, 292 Pac. 48 (1930); Com-
mercial Credit Go. v. McNelly, 171 Atl. 446 (Del. 1934); In re
-Lowry, 4o F. (2d) 321 (Va. 1930). But it would seem that the legis-
lature in abrogating the Bill of Sales 4ct, which had proved ineffective in
preventing fraudulent transfers, intended this act to be applied strictly
and unless a certificate of title is issued, intended no valid title to pass.
ZENDA L. LIEBERMAN
WARRANTIES - WATER AS FOOD
Plaintiff sued a restaurant keeper as a result of illness suffered by
him from eating a dinner purchased and served at defendant's restau-
rant. The illness was caused by bacteria present in the water furnished
by defendant from its own well. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied
warranty and negligence. Held, the trial court committed prejudicial
error (I) in refusing to charge the jury on the question of implied war-
ranty'; (2) in refusing to charge the jury that a violation of the pure
food and drug laws2 of Ohio is negligence per sea. Yochem v. Gloria,
Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E. (2d) 731, 13 Ohio Op. 29 (1938).
The pure food and drug laws are statutes passed for the protection
of the public and neither intent to violate them nor knowledge of their
violation are elements of the crime.4 If these sections are invoked in this
case, it is necessary to determine that drinking water is "food"' and that
'Ohio G. C. sec. 8395 in part: "Subject to the provisions of this chapter and of any
statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness
for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows:
". When the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
2 Ohio G. C. sec. 5774 in part: "No person, within this state, shall manufacture for
sale, offer for sale, sell or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver,
a drug or article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this chapter, ....
Ibid., sec. 5775, in part: "The term 'food' as used in this chapter, includes all
articles used by man for food, drink, flavoring extract, confectionery, or condiment,
whether simple, mixed or compound."
Ibid., sec. 5778, in part: "Food, drink, confectionery or condiments are adulterated
within the meaning of this chapter (i) if any substance or substances have been mixed
with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity;
(5) if it consists wholly, or in part, of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected,
tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not
in the case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal; . . . (7) if it contains any
added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health; ..."
'Portage Markets Co. v. George ass Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (19z4) ; Taugher
v. Bennington, 127 Ohio St. 142, 187 N.E. x9 (a933).
'Portage Markets Co. v. George, and cases cited therein, note 3, sopra.
• Ohio G. C. sec. 5775, note z, supra.
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as such it was "sold" ' or "delivered" ' to the plaintiff. A literal interpre-
tation of the statute allowed the court to find drinking water included;
whether or not the water was sold is a question which may be common
both to the application of the pure food laws and to the existence of an
implied warranty.
The authorities are not in accord on the question of whether or not
a restaurant keeper, who serves unwholesome food, is under an absolute
liability for damages resulting from the impurities, on the theory of an
implied warranty of fitness. Those which hold that he is not so liable
but is liable only for failure to use reasonable care, take the position that
the transaction is one of service and is not a sale of the food;' that title
to the food never passes. Those courts which impose an insurer's liability
upon the restaurant keeper adopt the view that the transaction is a sale
of the food.' This latter view was followed in the principal case, which
presented the question to the Ohio Supreme Court for the first time."0
However, the real issue in the case is more narrow and has never
before been decided. Both parties agree that a sale results and a war-
ranty is implied when a restaurant keeper furnishes a dinner to the
patron, but the defendant insists that drinking water furnished with the
8 Ohio G. C. sec. 5774, note z, supra. Ohio G. C. sec. 8381 (z) "A sale of goods is
an agreement whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a con-
tideration called the price."
7 See Ohio G. C. sec. 5774, note 2, supra. The cognate section, Si Ohio Laws 67,
Sec. 1, originally passed in 188 4 , did not contain the word "deliver." By amendment in
19o8, 99 Ohio Laws 257, it was provided that no one should deliver an article of food
ws hich was adulterated, and Ohio G. C. sec. 5774 contains this same prohibition. It is only
fair to assume that the legislature intended the word "deliver" to have force or it would
not have been added to the statute. Thus, it would seem that a mere delivery of adulterated
food is a violation of Ohio G. C. sec. 5774, a statute passed for the protection of the
public, and is negligence per se. Schell v. Du Bois, Admr., 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664
(1916).
'Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill 518, 45 N.E. Z53, 34 L.R.A. 464, 54 Am. St. Rep.
483 (1896); Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533, L.R.A. 1915B 481 (1914);
Valeri v. Pullman Co., ziS Fed. 519 (1914); Kenney v. Wong Len, Si N.H. 427, 128
Atl. 343 (5925); Nisky v. Child's Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 8o (1927)i BEALE,
INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS, sec. 169 (i906).
For an interesting comment on the authenticity of the early English "precedent" re-
lied upon by the above cases, see MELICK, TEE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK (1936) note
pp. 2oz, 2z, where the author points out that the early common law considered a taverner
as both giving and selling his food and drink, and imposed upon him an absolute duty to
furnish wholesome victuals. See also note 2, Ch. I, of MELICK, supra.
'Fried v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 6S, izo N.E. 407, 5 A.L.R. i1oo
(i918); Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App.Div. 171 N.Y.Supp.84o (1918); Greenwood
v. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (i199); Smith v. Carlos, z55 Mo. App. 488, 247
S.. 468 (x92z); Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, j44 N.E. 63S (1924); Cushing v.
Rodman, 8z Fed. (2d) 864 (1936); Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N.E. 18Z
(s925); Stanfield v. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 Pac. (2d) 878 (1936).
"'Two earlier cases in the lower courts held that serving pie to a patron for con-
sumption on the premises constitutes a sale of the pie by the restaurant keeper. Clark
Restaurant Co. v. Simmons, 29 Ohio App. 220, 163 N.E. 250 (1927); Woolworth Co. v.
Wilbois, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 16 (1929).
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dinner is "a mere gratuity and not a part of the dinner and therefore
not connected with the sale."
The argument of defendant seems to be that there was no warranty
with the water because no separate price was charged for the water. It
can readily be seen that if the presence of a warranty is to depend upon
the existence of a price tag on the warranted article, its value to the
consuming public will be greatly restricted. There are often many items
of food, varying in number with the policy of the particular restaurant,
for which no separate price is charged, which are not ordered by the
patron and yet are served to him with his order. It would seem that title
passes, at least to as much as he consumes.
An analogy may be drawn from those cases which have held that
the serving of game, liquor and adulterated food at restaurants and
boarding houses violates statutes prohibiting the sale of such commod-
ities." In the Worcester case 2 the court declared that "the purchase
of a meal includes all the articles that go to make up the meal. It is
wholly immaterial that no specific price is attached to those articles
separately."
However, it doesn't seem necessary to establish a sale of the water in
order to impose a warrantor's liability upon the defendant. A sale is not
the only transaction in which a warranty may be implied.'" The rela-
tionship between the parties was at least a contractual relationship" and
ccevery argument for implying a warranty in the sale of food is applicable
with even greater force to the serving of food to a guest or customer in
an inn or restaurant.' 15
The reason for implying a warranty is public interest in the preser-
vation of health'6 and it seems desirable for courts to extend the doc-
trine'" to keep pace with modern conditions. With so many of our
population depending upon restaurants, hotels and other eating places for
their meals and with the extreme difficulty of proving negligence in such
cases, the imposition of an absolute liability for the wholesomeness of all
"Commonwealth v. Worcester, 826 Mass. z6 (1879), (intoxicants with meals);
State v. Lotti, 7z Vt. 115, 47 AtI. 39Z (1900), (liquor with meals), Commonwealth v.
Warren, 16o Mass. 533, 36 N.E. 308 (1894), (impure milk served with meals); People
V. Clair, 221 N.Y. io8, 116 N.E. 868, L.R.A. 1g7F 766 (1917), (partridge served out
of season)l Commonwealth v. Miller, 131 Pa. xi8, 8 At. 938, 6 L.R.A. 633 (896),
(oleomargarine served with meals).
12 Note 1s, supra.
" Friend v. Child's Dining Hall Co., note 9, supra; Barringer v. Ocean S. S. Co.,
240 Mass. 405, 134 N.E. z65 (1921); WILLISTON, SALES (z ed.), sec. 247b.
"' Cashing v. Rodman, note 9, supra.
as WILLIsToN, note 13, supra.
'6 Weideman v. Keller, 171 I11 93, 49 N.E. zo (8897).
"Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, zs6 N.W. 790, 59 A.L.R. 8x64 (59z7).
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food items served in connection with the meal is desirable.'8 This liabil-
ity may be justified for the same reason that one who chooses to engage
in an ultra-hazardous activity is held absolutely liable.'9
JOHN M. BowsHER
x The rule laid down in the Year Books recognized an insurer's liability upon tav-
erners, victuallers and the like. "For if I come into a tavern to eat and the taverner gives
and sells me beer or goods which is corrupt, by which I am put to great suffering, I shall
clearly have an action against the taverner on the case even though he makes no warranty
to me." Year Book 9 Hen. VI S3. (Writer's Italics) This liability arose from the calling
or trade of the seller and as the result of old criminal statutes bottomed on public policy.
Burnby v. Bolett, x6 M. & W. 644, x53 Eng. Rep. 1348i Amss, LacTuaEs ON LFA.
HISTORY, p. 1375 3 HOLaSWORTH, HxsrORY oF ENGLIsiH LAw, pp. 385, 386, 447, 448;
MELICS, note 8, supra. The same reasons for the enforcement of the rule exist with even
greater force today.
" Parks v. Yost Pie Co, 93 Kan. 334, x44 Pac. 2oz (1914). See zS Yale L.J. 679
(zgs6).
TRADE REGULATIONS
EMPLOYER PROTECTION FROM EMPLOYEE COMPETITION
AFTER A TERM OF EMPLOYMENT
In the comparatively recent case of Curry v. Marquart1 the Su-
preme Court of Ohio had occasion, for the first time, to consider the
extent to which Ohio employers can protect themselves from the com-
petition of former employees. Plaintiff's business was that of dealer in
milk at wholesale, for whom the defendants operated a route. No writ-
ten lists of customers passed from employer to employees, nor did the
employer exact of these routemen covenants not to compete after the
termination of the employment. After a period of a few months, the
defendants broke off the relationship to establish a similar business,
competitive to the extent that their new route covered a portion of that
previously operated by them for the plaintiff. Faced with this threat of
competition at the hands of those familiar with his customers, plaintiff
sought the aid of a court of equity. Ohio doctrine seemed to favor his
suit, for in French Bros. Bauer Co. v. Townshend Bros. Milk Co.2 the
Court of Appeals for the First District had, despite the absence of a
written list of customers, enjoined similar employee competition on the
basis of a tort of unfair competition. But the Court of Appeals ruled
contrariwise in the instant litigation. Taking the case on a certification
of conflict, the Supreme Court adopted the view espoused by this latter
appellate court.
133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E. (zd) 868 (938).
zs Ohio App. 177, x52 N.E. 675 (xz).
